Effect Of Corporate Governance On Retail Segment In Singapore
Retail firms in Singapore
Corporate governance (CG) can be illustrated as the specific system by which business concerns can be directed and at the same time controlled. The primary objective is often mentioned as being the augmentation of corporate profit and gains from shareholders whilst having regard to the influence that this might have on other stakeholders of the firm. Sir Adrian Cadbury affirmed that corporate governance (CG) is apprehensive about presenting a sense of balance between different financial as well as social purposes as well as between individuals with communal intentions (Trickerand Tricker2015). In essence, the framework for corporate governance (CG) is expected to inspire effective employment of resources and to call for liability for principally stewardship of firms’ resources. In particular, the primary intention is to bring into line specific interests of different individuals, businesses and society as per reports of “Global Corporate Governance Forum, World Bank of the year 2000 (Du Plessiset al. 2018). Thus, in line with the above mentioned discussions mentioned above, framework and structure of corporate governance along with mechanisms are commonly targeted at enhancing overall efficacy of the company otherwise performance and delivering higher transparency along with accountability to firm’s shareholders along with other stakeholders.
Retail as well as consumer product firms encounter different challenges in competitive climate. Particularly, in different mature markets, companies operating in R&C industry in Singapore are constrained in their capability to develop and maintain specific profit margins as an outcome of a deflationary operating environment, saturation in the market, declining growth of population, and more discriminating but less trustworthy customers. In addition to this, pressure is the emergence of alternative channels of sales, a blurring of roles between suppliers as well as retailers and a transformation in the balance of power to different retailers. As suggested by Larcker and Tayan(2015), this has shifted the strategic concentration of the segment towards the expanding consumer market of both India as well as China that presents novel opportunities for growth by means of global sourcing, off-sourcing along with development of current retailers. Furthermore, owing to stakeholder demands and ensuing Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation, the retail as well as consumer product segment is also experiencing heightened pressure and stress of regulation (Cuomo et al. 2016). In essence, these involve greater liability and accuracy in the process of reporting of financial outcomes under the standards of IFRS together with US GAAP, enhanced level of corporate governance and engagement of the Board, stronger internal control documentation and a greater need for stringer risk management exercises across the business enterprises (Ilievet al.2015). One of the major challenges encountered by the retail and consumer product firms in Singapore is that of corporate governance.
The primary objective of the research study at hand is
– To comprehend and analyse overall level of corporate governance in particularly retail segment in Singapore
– To analytically assess difference between overall corporate governance between firms that is listed in mainly the Main Board and Catalyst
Q1: What is the degree and level of corporate governance disclosure in retail industry in Singapore?
Research Objectives
Q2: What is the difference in degree and level of corporate governance (CG) between xx firm listed in the Main Board vs Catalist?
The study of the level of corporate governance in firms can aid in understanding the requirement for enhancement of accountability of the firm for averting massive disaster before they take place (Iliev et al.2015). Based on the findings of the study, it will be possible to understand necessity of corporate governance associated disclosures, laws and exercises regarding corporate social accountability. It helps in understanding the practices that mainly take account of having an effectual board that is aware of roles as well as accountabilities and that is delivered with access to requisite information to perform these accountabilities. This study helps in gaining insight regarding the governance exercises that include strong self-governing component on the specific board with no power concentration in any specific individual. They also have formal as well as transparent procedures for appointment of boards, performance of boards and executive remuneration (Cuomo et al.2016).
Also, this study can help in identifying persons accountable for both disclosure as well as transparency, corporate governance associated disclosures and role of auditors in such kind of auditors (Armstrong et al.2015). Also, the study on corporate governance of firms operating in the retail sector can aid in understanding performance of companies as well as boards, association between both board and management of executive. Furthermore, this study also helps in understanding membership of boards and accountabilities, management of risk, compliance and internal controls. Moreover, this study helps in understanding communication between the board, with the shareholders and financial reporting.
The dissertation will be completed in a structured manner. The initial chapter of the dissertation constitutes of the introduction where a background has been provided and thereafter research question for this paper is constructed. In this manner, the next section of the dissertation is prepared which is known as the literature review. This section provides an idea about the topic and accordingly points out the previous studies that have been undertaken. This assists in understanding the process that will be undertaken with the help of which proper analysis of the paper can be constructed. The third section of the paper is the methodology where the process of collecting data and what kind of data will be considered so as to complete the entire paper. Investigation section will provide extensive answer as to how the research was done and the last section of the paper will provide an idea about the final result that has been attained and any kind of recommendation that can b given with the help of which the completion of the dissertation will be possible.
The current section reviews prior academic works undertaken on corporate governance by scholars and extracts relevant concepts useful concepts for the current study. This segment gives details about the benefits and advantages of corporate governance, varied latest codes of uses of corporate governance along with theoretical reflection. The literature review of the paper would initially look to discuss the definitions of corporate governance with the help of which an idea can be attained so that the work can proceed further. The benefits of corporate governance within a company will even be discussed with the help of which better idea about corporate governance will be known. The latest code of corporate governance will even be discussed with the help of which proper idea on the topic can be known with respect to Singapore. There are various theories that have been explained that are related to corporate governance.
Questions of the research study
As rightly indicated by Ocak and Ar?kbo?a (2017), corporate governance indicates towards the way a specific business corporation is governed. In essence, this is the manner by which firms are essentially directed and handled and implies undertaking the business according to the desires of stakeholders. Fundamentally, this is actually undertaken by Directors and the concerned committees for the firm’s stakeholder’s advantage. In actual fact, this corporate governance can be said to be all about balancing individual and at the same time individual objectives, in addition to socio-economic objectives. Essentially, corporate governance can be said to be an interaction between different participants that can help in shaping performance of associations and the way it is proceeding towards.
As suggested by Bain and Band (2016), good corporate governance makes certain success of corporate governance and ensure higher rate of economic growth. good corporate governance asserts the fact that nature of association between owners and managers operating in a business concern need to be healthy and there must not be any kind of disagreement (De Haanand Vlahu2016). Also, the owners need to see that actual performance of individuals is as per standard performance. As suggested by Ilievet al.(2015), corporate governance helps in the process of ascertainment of specific ways to undertake effectual strategic decisions. This provides authority and at the same time accountability to directors of the board of firms. Nowadays, in case of market oriented system, requirement for corporate governance stems. Additionally, level of efficacy of operation and globalization can be considered to be significant facets that advocate corporate governance. As such, corporate governance is necessary to build up value to firm’s stakeholders. Essentially, corporate governance makes certain maintenance of transparency that ensures strong and balanced economic development (Cuomo et al.2016). This also makes certain that interests of shareholders are shielded appropriately and helps in exercising rights and proper recognition of rights of corporation.
The backdrop of corporate governance- CG code goes back long back when it known as Combined Code, which provided the standards of the effective practices for the companies that are listed relating to composition of firms’ board and other factors as well (Tricker and Tricker 2015). The code used to get published by the Financial Reporting Council. The study on analysis of level and degree of corporate governance in firms operating in retail segment in Singapore can help in understanding method of governing firms, instating, laws, and customs along with strategies. The study at hand aids in understanding the study of corporate governance in the area of Singapore based on latest code of corporate governance. This study helps in understanding the practices stipulated under the latest codes under corporate governance laws. Essentially, this study helps in understanding the code implementing 15 principles, complemented by guidelines related to board matters, remuneration matters, accountability and executive remuneration (Tricker and Tricker 2015). This needs to be facilitated by nomination as well as remuneration committee for overseeing different matters. Particularly, this study also explains importance of accountability and audit, and requires institution of audit committees and internal audit function as a significant aspect of corporate governance as per latest codes. In addition to this, this study also helps in understanding significance of strong internal control procedures in place and this promotes greater disclosure for and communicates with different shareholders (McCaheryet al. 2016). Therefore, the current research paper discusses current developments along with future trends in the region of corporate governance-CG in the region of Singapore.
Research Contributions
This account of the Code has at its heart Principles of CG-corporate governance. Conformity with specific principles can be said to be obligatory. In essence, these principles established widely accepted features of proper corporate governance. Firms call for 1 to explain their corporate governance exercises with orientation to both the Principles as well as Provisions. The principles include conduct of affairs by the board, composition as well as guidance by the committee, clear separation of responsibilities between Board and firm’s, Management, membership of the firm’s board, performance of the board, matters of remuneration, level of remuneration, remuneration revelations and many others.
There have been numerous studies that have been prepared on the subject matter of corporate governance. In itself, corporate governance-CG can be considered to be one of the most important topics taken into consideration by firms. The companies in Singapore have been taking actions and steps with the help of which they have been able to manage their companies in an effective manner (McCahery et al. 2016).
There have been several meta-analyses that have been done on this topic and in this manner proper and effective governance has been maintained. It is seen that corporate governance has been very much influential in USA, where all the companies have their corporate governance plans with the help of which strengths and weaknesses of the companies are understood. The corporate governance plans are constructed on an annual basis and accordingly plans and processes are prepared and are reviewed accordingly (Davies 2016). There are countries like India and China that have even incorporated this plan with the help of which better understanding of the operations of the company can be understood. This process is even helpful in having an understanding of the relationship among the stakeholders and in this manner enhance functional activities are executed. The developing countries like India and Korea have been influencing this process and thereby all the companies have been making use of the same (Azeez 2015). Therefore, it can hereby be ascertained that corporate governance-CG has an important role in the process of development of the companies and hence the organizations in Singapore have been looking forward to incorporate the same. There have been limited studies on this topic in Singapore and therefore it has become pertinent to undertake a research on this topic for this country (Larcker and Tayan 2015).
Boards mainly comprise of executives as well as non-executive directors. In particular, executive directors indicate towards dependent directors together with non-executive ones together with independent directors. In any case one-third (1/3) of different independent directors are necessarily favoured in firms’ board, for effectual operation of board and for the purpose of unbiased tracking (Dalwai et al. 2015). Again, dependent directors are necessarily vital as they possess insider familiarity regarding the firm that is not available to diverse external directors. Nevertheless, they can exploit vital knowledge by shuffling wealth of corporations’ stockholders. In essence, a board comprised of different members who are necessarily not executives of a firm or investors (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017).
Dissertation Organization
As suggested by Admati (2017), self-governing board normally comprises of different members that possess no ties to the corporation in any manner. As a result there remains no or least possibility of engaging in a disagreement/clash of interest as autonomous directors possess no material welfare in an enterprise. Dignam and Galanis (2016) state that self-governing directors are indispensable as internal/dependent directors might perhaps get no admittance to external information.
Whincop (2017) mentioned the fact that the possibility that large sized boards can prove to be less effectual than small sized boards. At the time when boards are made up of numerous members, then agency issues might possibly enhance, since some directors might probably label along as free-rider. Also, they also disputed that at the time when size of the board becomes extremely big, and then it undertakes a more symbolic role and fulfils intended operations as part of the administration. Conversely, extremely small sized boards require benefit of possessing the spread of specialist advice and outlook around the specific table that is observed in large sized boards (Darrat et al. 2016). Additionally, large boards have greater propensity to be linked to an augmentation in diversity of board as to knowledge, expertise, gender as well as nationality. Taking away off wealth by chief executive officers or else inside directors is reasonably easier with small sized boards as small sized boards are also connected to a smaller figure of external directors. Essentially, the fewer number of directors in particularly small sized boards are engaged with decision making procedure, leaving fewer time for tracking actions (Christensen et al. 2015).
Lins et al. (2017) mentioned the fact that corporations having small sized boards (minimum 5 members of the board) are more informed regarding earnings of the corporation and therefore can be concerned to be having superior tracking capabilities. Founded on findings of the study, Abdullah et al. (2016) mentioned that valuations of listed corporations of Singapore and Malaysia are observed to be highest at the time when members of the board comprise of 5 members. Arora and Sharma (2016) mentioned that in evaluation of both small as well as medium sized Danish corporations, it can be hereby observed that size of the board has no influence on overall performance for particularly a board size that is below 6. Again, there is seen to be a negative relationship between the two when board size rises to 7 or above. Dalwai et al. (2015) observed no solid evidence on linkage between board size and level and degree of firm performance.
Comparison of impact of structure of board on performance of corporations shows negative association for different Japanese corporation. This was enumerated by market/book ratio as well as return earned on assets. However, no association was observed between two different variables for particularly Australian counterpart. Nevertheless, contrary to Japanese corporations, the ratios of different directors as well as female directors to overall members of the board have a positive influence on essentially the Australian section (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017). At variance with above mentioned findings, it can be found that there was a positive influence on corporate performance with large sized boards. Assessment of 147 Singaporean corporations from 1995 data reflects the fact structure of board is endogenously ascertained when the outcomes of OLS reflect the board size, structure of headship and size of enterprise have a positive control on performance of enterprises (Zabri et al. 2016).
Review of Literature
Mishra and Mohanty (2014) observed a direct positive linkage between board size and firm performance (enumerated by the dimension of Tobin’s Q) in essentially the U.S banking segment. Larcker and Tayan (2015) outcomes propose the fact that this kind of performance association might possibly be industry specific, reflecting the fact those large sized boards’ functions well for definite type of corporations based on structures of business concerns. Essentially, a meta-analysis founded on 131 studies undertaken by Ferrero?Ferrero et al. (2015) revealed that large sized boards are related to higher performance of business enterprises.
Qiu et al. (2016) examined the Corporate Governance as well as firm valuation by means of an index of Corporate Governance and supplementary variables associated to ownership arrangement, board features, along with leverage to deliver a inclusive explanation of Corporate Governance at particularly level of firm. In essence, an enhancement in index of Corporate Governance by 1 point generated an enhancement of market capitalization by approximately 8.6%. Larcker and Tayan (2015) investigated the influence of Corporate Governance-CG on performance on the whole by presenting a Corporate Governance-CG index. This index replicates predicted productivity at firm level in the region of Ukraine. In essence, the outcomes mean that a 1-point-enhancement in the index leads to approximately 0.4%-1.9% enhancement in overall performance (Zabri et al. 2016). Again, a most unpleasant to most excellent change forecasts a 40% enhancement in performance of corporation. Data on firms in several African nations shows that superior governance exercises are related to greater valuations and improved operational performance.
This specific theory is regarded as a principal role that assists in explaining specific role of board directors on performance of corporations. This theory was proposed by Steven Ross and Barry Mitnick and they created the theory in order to provide better understanding of corporate governance.Armstrong et al.(2015) assessed research study synthesizes the same into main regulation so as to explore this association. With regard to agency theory, it can be hereby said that the principal as well as agent can be considered as shareholders and firm’s directors. Essentially, their theory reflected the fact that there exists an irregularity between the advantages of owners and managers founded on attributes of four features as illustrated legalistic standpoint. With the help of agency theory the actions and the interests of all the groups can be known and thereby better understanding of their actions can be known. With the help of this theory the functioning and the activities of the stakeholders can be known and thereby better steps and actions can be undertaken.
Contrary to agency theory and its premises, Mishra and Mohanty (2014) assessed the novel approach to the association between the advantage of shareholders as well as managers that is developed founded on psychological along with sociological notions. This theory was proposed by Donaldson and Davis and this was created to have an understanding about the relationship among the management and the owners of the company. This understanding is significant in order to operate an organization in an effective manner. Essentially, the interests of different individuals and business concerns are mixed and managers operate firms to make best use of utility (Larcker and Tayan2015).
This theory is very popular as it helps in determining the factors that have an effect on the relationship among the owners and the management. With the help of this theory, various plans and processes can be constructed with the help of which better performance of the companies can be attained and efficient operational activities can be ascertained.
S/NO. |
Authors |
Year |
Country |
Sample Size |
1 |
McNulty, T., Zattoni, A. and Douglas, T., |
2013 |
USA |
20 |
2 |
Siebels, J.F. and zuKnyphausen?Aufseß |
2012 |
Russia |
26 |
3 |
Wintoki, M.B., Linck, J.S. and Netter |
2012 |
NA |
NA |
4 |
Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G. and Nakajima |
2013 |
NA |
12 |
5 |
Aguinis, H. and Glavas |
2012 |
NA |
NA |
The review of literature has delivered ideas and concepts about corporate governance. This section has addressed all the key areas that are related to corporate governance-CG codes. Various themes that are related to corporate governance-CG have even been addressed with the help of which an idea is obtained that will be helpful in undertaking the data analysis process.
The current segment explains in detail the context of the research that illustrates in detail the background setting of the study. This section on research context gives details regarding retail industry in the Singapore market and the two forms of the Singapore stock exchange. Thereafter, this segment explains about implementation of quantitative analysis of secondary data with justification. Moving further, this section throws light on data collection, data sources, sample details, sampling techniques and explicates data analysis and techniques of interpretation. This paper has selected retail companies mainly due to the fact that the retail companies in Singapore are more and they have been the ones that have been operating in an effective manner. It is due to this fact that retail companies have been selected.
The retail market of Singapore is anticipated to stay demanding and difficult for both landlords as well as retailers in the midst of indecisive market outlook, feeble retail spending, increasing business cost along with shortage of manpower. Essentially, retail rents are liable to encounter downward load for the year 2017 since demand remained flexible with forthcoming insertion of novel retail space (Dumay and Cai 2015). Also, landlords as well as merchants have the need to drive superior innovation in particular business stratagems to find the way out of the hard-hitting retail climate. Founded on bi-yearly Consumer Confidence Index, index of Singapore witnessed further decrease by around 3.6 points to approximately 30.0 in H2 in the period 2016 as compared to H1 in the period 2016. Essentially, Retail Sales Index (not including motor vehicles as well as non- adjusted ones, essentially at stable prices) decreased by around 4.6% year-after-year during the period 2017 (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017).
The enterprises listed on Singapore stock exchange (SGX) are categorised into two different clusters: the firms listed on Singapore stock exchange (SGX) Main board and the firms listed on essentially SGX Catalyst.
The researcher has utilized quantitative analysis of secondary data on corporate governance for 30 different firms. Selection of this specific technique can be said to be justified in this case as this is a viable option for the learner facing constraints of limited time as well as resources. The process will look to assess the various corporate governance indexes that are within corporate governance. In this manner, the various aspects of corporate governance like auditing, structure and process of management and the board can be understood (Taylor et al. 2015). Compliance of the companies and corporate responsibility along with the financial transparency of the companies and information disclosure is very important (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017). The ownership structure as the exercise of the control rights will be taken into consideration with the help of which proper actions and analysis can be undertaken. Therefore quantitative analysis would be done with the help of the corporate governance index.
The current study utilizes secondary data for undertaking the current study. The MAS and the data in relation to 30 companies have been collected from the SGX websites and online resources and many other sources are taken into account for acquirement of secondary data. Also, corporate governance code is taken into consideration. Essentially, the code of corporate governance from yearly report of the firm is taken into consideration (Lewis 2015). The corporate governance codes examination refers to examination of annual reports of the firm where there is need to check compliance of companies to different codes of CG. Essentially, higher match implies degree of compliance of the firm (Dalwai et al. 2015). Therefore, there is need to find data from annual reports of chosen companies. The CG Code along with amended the CG Index need to be reviewed in this regard.
The current study uses data of 30 companies operating in the retail segment in Singapore that necessarily use quantitative data and need to be a listed firm. In addition to this, the study also refers to specific case studies that deal with the current subject matter under deliberation. The 30 companies have been selected from a total of 45 companies that were shortlisted earlier.
The 30 different firms operating in the retail segment of the nation Singapore are selected for the current study under consideration. The learner has selected the sample using non-probabilistic sampling where the samples do not have equal probability of being selected. The 30 listed retail firms are chosen by the learner based in their own judgement and are tested for maintenance of corporate governance. For that reason, the reports and declarations particularly on corporate governance of the firm are analysed to examine their match. Also, review of prior literature presented by scholars is carried out. The primary themes are analytically examined.
Quantitative analysis of acquired secondary data for the study uses thematic analysis as well as content analysis. Again, conversely, corporate governance-CG codes of the enterprises scrutinized and matched is necessarily applied rates and points that can quantify the points acquired by firm (Dalwai et al. 2015). Thereafter, the total found out for each of the firms can be ranked from particularly highest to essentially the lowest score (refer to appendix). The total scores for each of the company are presented and the same are ranked starting from the highest to the lowest rank as per scores (Flick 2015). The minimum as well as maximum score based on ranks are presented. Moving further, the learner implement the statistical technique of standard deviation utilizing Microsoft excel software
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statics of particularly selected data series offers an overview of the chosen data series. A checklist has been prepared and presented with the assistance of which corporate governance-CG score has been acquired. Descriptive statistics including enumeration of Return on assets (ROA) and Return on equity (ROE) are approximated. Descriptive or else summary dimensions take in mean (average), median, range, standard deviation (S.D), maximum, minimum along with other dimensions of central tendency and nature of dispersion (Quinlan et al. 2019). Descriptive statistics of ROA and ROE of the thirty selected companies is presented in below mentioned table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Return on Assets-ROA and Return on Equity-ROE
From the summary statistics, average return on asset for the selected thirty companies is 8-0.06. This implies the selected companies on an average earn a negative return on assets with the return being -0.06 percent. Median value of ROA series is 0.04. That means half of the selected companies have a return on asset of 0.04 percent. Standard deviation of the return on asset series is 0.21. Standard deviation of the series exceeds the mean return on. The high standard deviation indicates return on asset is highly fluctuating for the companies. This is not a good sign of financial position of the company and adversely affects confidence of the investors (Choy 2014). The highest return on asset is 0.25. The return on assets is observed for Koufu.
The average return on equity for the selected thirty companies is 0.18 percent. This implies the selected companies’ record an average earn an average return of 0.18 percent on shareholder’s equity. Median value of ROE series is 0.09 percent. That means half of the selected companies have a return on equity of 0.09percent. Standard deviation of the return on equity series is 1.29 percent. Standard deviation of the series exceeds return on equityaverage return. The high standard deviation indicates return on equity is highly fluctuating for the companies (Walliman 2017). This is not a good sign of financial position of the company. The highest return on equity is 6.13 percent. The return on assets is observed for Nobel Group limited. The lowest return on asset in 2017 has been accounted by Jatenergy Limited. The company recorded a negative asset return of 3.16 percent.
Bivariate correlation matrix models the degree of association among the interested variables (Jamshed 2014). The table below shows correlation of ROA and ROE to that of different indices of corporate governance.
Table 2: Bivariate correlation matrix
Return on assets constitutes a positive association with board size. This shows an increase in one of these indicators leads to an increase in others. The correlation however is very week as the corresponding value of coefficient is only 0.127. Board Independence and ROA show positive association with an associated small value (0.188) of correlation coefficient. Board competencies have an inverse association with asset return (Quinlan et al. 2018). Coefficient of corresponding correlation is very small with value of coefficient being only – 0.056. Directorship and CEO Chairman Separation again have a negative correlation with ROA. The associated correlation coefficient for the two concerned indicators is – 0.302 and – 0.032 respectively. Board and committee meetings have a positive association with ROA and have a correlation coefficient of 0.11. Rest of the three dimensions of governance that is independence of nomination committee, selection of directors and appraisal of board and individual director establish a negative association with ROA (Brannen 2017). That is change in either of the three variables moves ROA of the selected companies to an opposite direction.
Return on Equity constitutes a positive linkage with board size, board sovereignty and competencies of firms’ board. The respective correlation coefficient is 0.317, 0.163 and 0.029. That is an increase in one of these indicators lead to an increase in ROA and vice-versa. Directorship, CEO Chairman Separation and Board and committee meeting show a negative correlation with ROA. The associated correlation coefficient for the three concerned indicators are – 0.250, -0.044 and – 0.198 respectively. The independence of nomination committee and selection of directors again found to constitute a negative degree of association with equity return (Mackey and Gass 2015). The coefficient for associated correlation between ROE and appraisal of Board and individual Director is 0.114 indicating a positive but very week extent of association between the two.
Analysis of correlation though reveals degree of association but it indicates nothing regarding direction of relationship between the targeted variables (Mackey and Gass 2015). Two separate regressions are conducted to find out impact of difference indices of governance and that of ROA and ROE of the selected companies. Table 3 and Table 4 provide summary regression results of the two regression models.
Table 3: Regression output of ROA and Governance indices
In the regression model, R square or coefficient of determination is obtained as 0.52. The independent variables that are different indicators of governance together account 52 percent variation in Return on assets of different companies. Of the governance indices some has a positive influence on ROA while effect of some others on ROA is negative. Among the selected indices board size, board independence, board and committee meetings and selection of directors have a favorable effect of asset return (Mackey and Gass 2015). Others like board competencies, directorship, CEO- Chairman Separation, nomination committee independence and Board and individual director appraisal have an unfavorable bearing for asset return of the chosen companies. Neither of the selected indices however is statistically significant.
Table 4: Regression output of ROE and Governance indices
In the second regression model, R square or coefficient of determination is obtained as 0.67. The independent variables that are different indicators of governance together account 67 percent variation in return on equity of different companies. Of the governance indices five components have a positive influence on ROE while the rest fours have an adverse influence on ROE (Bain and Band 2016). Among the selected indices board size, board independence, board competencies, CEO- Chairman Separation and board and individual director appraisal have a favorable effect of asset return (Walliman 2017). Others like directorship, board and committee meetings, nomination committee independence and selection of directors have an unfavorable bearing for asset return of the chosen companies. For the entire coefficient the obtained coefficient exceeds corresponding significance level. This indicate acceptance of the null hypothesis considering no significance relation between governance and ROE of the company (Flick 2015).
Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on quantitative results obtained from analysis of corporate governance codes of publicly listed firms, it can be hereby mentioned that on an average basis there is a negative return earned on firm’s assets. The high level of standard deviation reflects highly fluctuating return on assets. Standard deviation of firms’ return on equity is recorded to be 1.29% and this indicates that standard deviation surpasses average return on equity. In this case as well, higher level of standard deviation points toward return on equity that is highly fluctuating for the firms. Particularly, this can be considered to be a negative sign for the corporation. Also, outcomes of bivariate correlation analysis reveal the nature of association between (ROA/ROE) and specific indices of corporate governance. Results of the correlation analysis indicates towards a positive association with board size, reflecting the fact that increase in one variable leads to increase in other as well. Correlation analysis replicates a weak nature of association between the variables. As per consequences of the study, it can be hereby mentioned that there exists a positive association between independence of firms’ board and ROA although it is insignificant. Results of the study also reflect the fact that board competencies have an inverse relationship with return earned on firms’ assets. Similarly, an inverse association can be found between variables (directorship and CEO Chairman Separation, board and committee meetings, independence of nomination committee, selection of directors, appraisal of board and individual director) with ROA of firms. Thus, it shows that changes in the corporate governance levels have an inverse relationship with performance of firms. Therefore, in terms of generation of income out of assets of corporations, it can be hereby mentioned that level of corporate governance as enumerated by its variables exert negative impact on returns.
Similarly, a positive association can be observed between size of firms’ board, sovereignty of board and competencies of firms’ board with return on equity-ROE. The correlation coefficient is enumerated to be 0.317, 0.163 and 0.029 respectively. This shows that an enhancement in one of the parameters directs the way towards enhancement in ROA. Also, there is said to be a negative connection between return on equity-ROE and autonomy of definite nomination committee and engagement of firms’ directors. Also, there is said to be a negative association between firms’ ROE and variables such as appraisal of Board and individual Director. This indicates a positive relationship although week association between the two. On the whole, correlation analysis carried out for the study indicates towards degree and nature of association, however, it reflects nothing regarding course of association between different targeted variables. Also, separate regression analysis is undertaken to discover influence of variance indices of governance on ROA of the selected firms. As per regression model, R square/coefficient of determination is registered to be 0.52. Independent variable indicates towards diverse governance indicators jointly account for 52% in return on firms’ assets. Out of governance indices, it can be hereby observed that there subsists a positive impact on ROA whilst effect of others on ROA is found to be negative. Among the chosen indices ( size of board, independence of board, meetings of both board as well as committee, selection of directors have a desirable impact of asset return. There are different variables (board competencies, chairman division, and independence of nomination committee as well as appraisal of board/individual have an undesirable manner for asset return for selected firms. The chosen indices are observed to be statistically significant. Essentially, the null hypothesis is accepted, substantiating the fact that there subsists no statistically noteworthy relationship between ROA and degree of corporate governance-CG of corporations. Founded on outcomes of research study, it can thus be asserted that corporate governance-CG does not have an effect on level and degree of performance of enterprises.
Again, regression analysis carried out for ROE and government indices refers towards a complete set of statistical procedures for the purpose of approximating the associations between different variables. R square recorded to be 0.67 shows statistical dimensions and reflects variability of essentially the mean data around particularly the mean data. Independent variable that reflects diverse indicators present 67% difference in return on equity of varied firms. Analysis of regression of the amassed data reflect the fact that there are five different elements of government indices that exert a positive influence on return earned on firms’ equity. On the other hand, there are four other indices that have adverse influence on return earned on firms’ equity. Among different indices board size of firms, board autonomy, board proficiencies, separation of CEO and chairmanship together with appraisal of board/individual director have a desirable impact on return on asset for all the selected business enterprises. Again, for different coefficients, acquired coefficient beats significance level. Essentially, this replicates the fact that no noteworthy relationship between degrees of corporate governance-CG and return generated out of equity of enterprises. This regression analysis therefore helps in substantiating the fact that there exists no considerable association between level of different indices of corporate governance-CG and firm performance pointers selected for the research.
Founded on the outcomes of the research, it can be hereby stated that corporate governance level (indicated by different indices of firms) does not affect level of performance of firms. There are different firms categorized as main board as well as catalyst. With regards to corporate governance index, it can be hereby mentioned that level of the same does not exert any kind of impact on the firm and its level of performance (as indicated by specific financial indicators-ROA/ROE). Thus, study assessing structures of board, framework of committee and many others combine governance indicators presents measures indicated for 30 selected firms and presents degree of particularly corporate governance.
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